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David Armstrong has recently proposed a new view according to which the 
properties of a thing are parts of that thing and the predication of properties 
is necessary (Armstrong 2004). In what follows, after a general remark about 
Professor Armstrong’s conception of ontology, I shall raise objections 
against this view and defend an alternative account of the connection be-
tween particulars and their properties, involving a kind of ontological de-
pendence which is different from Armstrong’s necessary connection be-
tween particulars and their properties.  
According to Armstrong’s ontology there are particulars and properties. 
Properties are universals: if a and b are particulars and F is a universal, then 
a’s F-ness is numerically identical with b’s F-ness. When Armstrong says 
‘There are universals’ he does not make a claim about the meanings of 
predicates, he does not answer a question of semantics. Already in his early 
work on universals he fought against the mistake of confusing universals 
with meanings:  
                                                      
* I thank Professor Armstrong for commenting on my comments. I express my gratitude 
to the Free State of Bavaria for supporting me during the time of this work through the 
‘Bayerischer Habilitationsförderpreis’. I am grateful to Johannes Hübner for helpful criti-
cism.  
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I believe that the identification of universals with meanings (connotations, inten-
sions) [...] has been a disaster for the theory of universals. A thoroughgoing separa-
tion of the theory of universals from the theory of the semantics of general terms is 
in fact required. (Armstrong 1978, xiv) 
Armstrong’s reason for assuming universals is not that predicates cannot be 
replaced by, or defined in terms of, other types of expressions.1 It is not that 
we are ‘ontologically committed’ to universals. His aim is to describe what 
there is, and he holds that the resemblance between two things consists in 
there being a universal that both things instantiate. His aim is not to analyze 
concepts and statements but to describe the structure of reality independ-
ently of how we ordinarily think or speak about it. He wants to name not 
truth conditions but truthmakers. In contemporary philosophy, Armstrong 
is the forerunner of metaphysics that is independent of semantics, and not 
many have followed him. There is a great gulf between Armstrong and phi-
losophers who are used to doing metaphysics as a discipline more closely 
related to semantics, philosophers who are less sceptical about the linguistic 
turn. Those from the other side of the gulf are in danger to misunderstand 
some of Armstrong’s claims as claims about statements although Armstrong 
intends them to be about their truthmakers.  
Armstrong rejects bundle theories, according to which things are bundles of 
properties and hence consist just of properties. He holds that properties are 
borne by substrata, by property bearers. According to his new view, the link 
between particular and universal is partial identity. The properties of a thing 
are parts of that thing. He also says that the particular and its universal 
‘overlap’. This takes Armstrong to the view that predication is necessary. 
‘Once one has identity, even if only partial identity, there will be found ne-
cessity.’ If a thing loses one of its properties it thereby ceases to exist, it be-
comes a different entity. Likewise the universal becomes a different entity. 
Every thing has all of its properties necessarily.  
                                                      
1  David Lewis realizes that Armstrong is doing something rather different from what au-
thors do who say they do metaphysics when he writes: ‘I suggest that Armstrong has an un-
familiar notion of analysis. Analysis is not, primarily, a quest for definitions. Rather, it is a 
quest for truth-makers.’ (Lewis 1992, 203) 
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It is Armstrong’s presupposition, I take it, that a thing has its parts necessar-
ily. Given that the properties of a thing are parts of that thing it follows that 
a thing has all of its properties necessarily, in the sense that if it loses one it 
ceases to exist and becomes a different thing, and if it had had different 
properties it would have been a different thing.2 Likewise, universals are 
necessarily instantiated as they are. ‘Having just the instances it has is essen-
tial to the universal being what it is’ (Armstrong 2004). I have four objec-
tions.  
1. Overlap 
Armstrong says that a particular and its universals ‘overlap’. According to 
Armstrong’s conception of universals (at least until his A World of States of 
Affairs), if a and b are F then a’s F-ness and b’s F-ness are numerically iden-
tical. But then F is a part of a, and F has no parts that are not part of a. The 
particular and its universal overlap, but they do not properly overlap, they 
do not overlap in the ordinary sense. This does not affect Armstrong’s claim 
that a thing has its properties necessarily. But why does Armstrong hold that 
a universal has its instances necessarily? The instances of a universal are not 
parts of the universal. If b ceases to instantiate F, then F is less often instanti-
ated, but it does not lose a part. There is therefore no reason to assume that 
F ceases to be and becomes a different entity – unless Armstrong now gives 
up his view that a’s F-ness and b’s F-ness are numerically identical.  
2. Mereological essentialism 
Armstrong assumes that a thing has its parts necessarily, i.e. if a whole loses 
one of its parts it thereby ceases to exist. This doctrine, sometimes called 
mereological essentialism, has its defenders,3 but it is neither uncontroversial 
                                                      
2  Armstrong says only that had the particular lacked one of the properties that it actually 
has, it would have been a different particular. He does not say explicitly that if a thing loses 
one of its properties, it thereby ceases to exist. But I assume that the former entails the lat-
ter.  
3  Mereological essentialism is held by Ingarden 1965, §43, p. 110, and also by Chisholm 
1976, Appendix B and ch. III.  
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nor without alternative. Contra mereological essentialism one may hold that 
some things can survive the loss or replacement of some of their parts. After 
all we say that a car can have one its door replaced or I can lose a finger or I 
(or my body) can get a new kidney without ceasing to exist or becoming a 
different thing. Things which, contra mereological essentialism, can survive 
the replacement of parts are sometimes called entia successiva (van Inwagen 
1991).  
Roderick Chisholm (1976, Appendix B and ch. III) proposed an alternative 
to Armstrong’s view that things do not survive the loss of parts. He says of 
entia successiva that they are ‘constituted’ by entities for which mereological 
essentialism is true. A tyre of my car was replaced means (roughly): There 
was one thing, T1, which ceased to exist when the tyre was replaced; there 
was another thing, T2, containing the parts of T1 except a different tyre. Be-
fore the replacement of the tyre my car was constituted by T1, after that by 
T2. My car survived the replacement of the tyre, but T1 did not. Chisholm 
thus provides a method to translate sentences apparently about cars that can 
change parts into sentences about cars that cease to exist when they lose 
parts. For him there are entia successiva, but they can be reduced to more 
basic entities for which mereological essentialism is true.  
Roman Ingarden (1965, §43), on the other hand, argues that individual 
things (substances), for which mereological essentialism is not true, are more 
basic than wholes, for which mereological essentialism is true. A thing, e.g. a 
table, can also be taken as, or conceptualized, as a whole. The scheme of a 
whole is then ‘thrown over’ the thing (Ingarden 1965, 117). The whole 
ceases to exist if it loses a part, but a thing can survive the loss of a property 
or a part (although strictly speaking only wholes but not things have parts).  
My own view is that we can form the concepts of part and whole in different 
ways. We can stipulate that a whole that loses a part thereby ceases to exist. 
Ordinarily, however, if we ask questions about the diachronic identity of a 
thing with parts, we do so on the background of a certain sortal concept un-
der which the thing is subsumed. The sortal concept provides the conditions 
of diachronic identity of the thing. Whether the loss of a certain part means 
the end of the thing depends on the sortal concept. A violin, for example, 
does not become a different violin and does not cease to exist if the finger-
board is renewed.  
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At any rate, if a theory entails that a violin ceases to exist if it loses a part, 
then that counts strongly against that theory, because that seems just false 
and there is no discovery that would convince us otherwise. Likewise, if a 
theory entails, as Armstrong’s new view does, that a violin becomes a differ-
ent violin if it loses a property, then that counts strongly against that theory.  
3. Essential properties  
My view that conditions of diachronic identity are provided by sortal con-
cepts leads me to relativism about necessary (or ‘essential’) properties. 
Whether the loss of a certain property entails the end of the existence of the 
thing does not depend on the thing in itself but on the sortal concept under 
which the thing is subsumed. A traditional substance ontologist (e.g. Roman 
Ingarden) denies this because he holds that the property bearer of a thing is 
an exemplification of a kind universal. A thing continues to exist as long as 
its kinded property bearer continues to exist. What this kind is and on 
which properties the property bearer is dependent (the ‘essential properties’) 
does not depend on the sortal concept; rather, it is something to be discov-
ered about the thing in itself.  
It seems to me that Armstrong’s ontology leads to relativism about essential 
properties too. He argues that all monadic universals are properties and that 
there are no kind universals (which he calls ‘substantival universals’) irre-
ducible to conjunctions of properties (Armstrong 1978, 61-67). It seems to 
follow that it is nothing to be discovered about the thing in itself what the 
kind is which is relevant for the conditions of diachronic identity of the 
thing; that is, the kind K such that it is true to say that the thing ceased to 
exist if and only if it is not a K anymore. It seems to me that what the condi-
tions of diachronic identity are then depends on under which sortal concept 
the thing is subsumed, and there are several sortal concepts under which the 
thing can be subsumed. The end of the existence of a thing with parts is on-
tologically just a change in which properties are instantiated where. It differs 
from other such changes only because through it a certain sortal concept 
does not apply anymore.  
Armstrong, however, is not a relativist about essential properties (as he has 
confirmed in conversation). He holds that all ‘predication of properties is 
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necessary’ in the sense that if a particular lacked a property which it actually 
has, then it would have been a different particular. So my objection here is 
that Armstrong’s ontology leads to relativism about necessary properties 
and that he therefore should not hold that any, let alone all, predication of 
properties is necessary. There is no ontological fact of the matter whether 
the loss of a certain property entails the end of the existence of the thing.  
4. Ontological glue 
Armstrong’s main argument against bundle theories is that ‘they have great 
difficulty with the metaphysics of the uniting principle or principles of bun-
dling’ (Armstrong 2004). They fail to provide the ontological glue holding 
the bundle together. Armstrong’s alternative is that the link between par-
ticular and universal is partial identity. I shall now raise an objection against 
Armstrong’s view and, in the light of this objection, defend a solution of the 
gluing problem that is also available to the bundle theorist.  
Armstrong wants to solve the gluing problem with his new view. The prop-
erties of a thing are parts of it, and if it loses a property it thereby ceases to 
exist. The thing has its properties necessarily. Therefore the thing cannot 
lose properties and has in this sense unity, the gluing problem is thus solved. 
The link between particular and universal is partial identity and not a genu-
ine relation of compresence or instantiation, the acceptance of which would 
lead to a regress.  
I have two objections against this solution. First, according to classical ex-
tensional mereology, a whole, or mereological sum, continues to exist as 
long as all its parts continue to exist. Consider a thing which, according to 
Armstrong’s new view, is a whole of which the properties of the thing are 
parts. According to Armstrong’s theory of universals (Armstrong 1978 and 
1997), if a thing loses a property the property does not thereby cease to exist 
(at least as long as it is instantiated by other things). So the whole consisting 
of the properties of a thing is not destroyed by the thing losing a property. It 
continues to exist even if the properties that are parts of it are not all instan-
tiated by the thing anymore. According to Armstrong’s new view the link 
between a particular and its universals is the same as, and nothing more 
than, the link between a whole and its parts. But the link between a particu-
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lar and one of its universals can be broken up whilst the link between the 
whole and its parts, one of which is the universal, continues to hold. With 
tropes the situation would be different, but with universals as parts of things 
Armstrong’s solution does not seem to work. 
Of course, intuitively we would say that if a violin is taken apart then the 
whole ceases to exist, or that if a leg is cut off a table the table loses a part 
and the leg is no longer a part of the table. That is so because, against classi-
cal extensional mereology, we often mean by a whole something whose parts 
are somehow connected.4 We usually use a concept of a whole according to 
which the whole loses a part if a certain relation between the part and the 
rest of the whole ceases to hold; e.g. if the part ceases to be physically con-
nected to the rest of the whole, i.e. if it is cut off. But such a concept of a 
whole would not help Armstrong because it would require an additional re-
lation connecting the parts. Armstrong would have to use a concept of a 
whole according to which a thing is a whole that has the properties of the 
thing as parts and that loses a property as part if the thing ceases to instanti-
ate the property. But accepting a relation of instantiation besides the relation 
of being a part is exactly what Armstrong wants to avoid.  
Secondly, I suggest that necessary predication does not glue a universal to a 
particular in the required way. The trouble is that the dependence relation 
that Armstrong uses is no glue. Let me explain by sketching Edmund 
Husserl’s und Roman Ingarden’s account of the unity of a thing, which I 
think succeeds where Armstrong’s new view does not succeed.5 Husserl and 
Ingarden, like Armstrong, using the concept of a part in a wide sense, take 
the properties of a thing to be parts of the thing. Husserl and Ingarden, 
however, take properties to be particulars (‘Momente’), ‘tropes’ as they are 
called today. (They believe that there are universals as well as tropes, tropes 
being exemplifications of universals.) However, unlike some modern de-
fenders of tropes (e.g. Campbell 1990), they do not take them to be inde-
                                                      
4  Various such concepts of a whole have been developed in detail by Ingarden 1965, §43.  
5  Edmund Husserl presents his view in his Third Logical Investigation ‘On the theory of 
wholes and parts’ (Husserl 1913). His Polish pupil Roman Ingarden accepts much of 
Husserl’s view and develops it further in his mammoth treatise on ontology The Contro-
versy about the Existence of the World (Ingarden 1964, §14, and 1965, ch. VIII).  
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pendent entities. They are not little nuggets. Husserl says that the properties 
of a thing are intimately united, they penetrate each other, such that it is im-
possible (which for Husserl and Ingarden means synthetically impossible, 
not analytically or logically impossible) that one exists without being to-
gether with other properties in the unity of a thing. Husserl and Ingarden 
call properties “seinsunselbständig”, i.e. self-insufficient entities. Tropes 
cannot exist on their own. Self-insufficiency is a kind of ontological depend-
ence. Husserl distinguishes in this sense ‘concrete parts’ of a thing, which 
can be chopped off, from ‘abstract parts’ of a thing, e.g. a thing’s properties, 
which cannot be chopped off. The properties of a thing are mutually de-
pendent on each other so that they cannot be chopped off (although some 
can be replaced by new properties) 
Now this kind of ontological dependence functions as ontological glue be-
cause it prevents a thing from falling apart. In Armstrong’s new view, how-
ever, there is nothing that prevents a thing from falling apart. It says that if a 
thing falls apart it becomes a different thing, but it leaves open the possibil-
ity of the thing falling apart. I therefore suggest that bundle theories can be 
defended against Armstrong’s criticism that they cannot explain the unity of 
a thing, and that Armstrong’s own explanation of the unity of a thing is ob-
jectionable.  
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